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Abstract: In this article, we focus on manifest interparty conflict over policy issues and the role 
of coalition agreements in solving these conflicts. We present empirical findings on the charac-
teristics of coalition agreements including deals over policy controversy and on inter-party con-
flict occurring during the lifetime of governments in Germany, Belgium, Italy and the Nether-
lands. We analyze the ways in which parties in government were or were not constrained by 
written deals over disputed issues. Coalition agreements from all four countries include specific 
policy deals, one third of which are precisely defined. These policy deals concern both consen-
sual and controversial  issues. Our central finding is that, in the case of intra-party conflict,  
parties almost always fall back on the initial policy deals when these exist. As such, policy state-
ments of the coalition agreement facilitate decision making in each of the countries studied.
Keywords: coalition governments; post-electoral coalition agreements; pre-electoral coalition 
agreements; Belgium; Germany; Italy; Netherlands
1. Introduction
Parties that join a coalition want to remain visible to 
the electorate, but once in office they need to com-
promise with their partners to pass policies. This co-
operation  is  inherently  risky  because  parties  might 
have to support  policies  passed by the government 
that are different from the policies they defended dur-
ing the election campaign. To reduce uncertainty and 
facilitate political deals with partners, party leaders
© 2013 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published 
under a Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
forming a new coalition government often negotiate a 
coalition agreement. A coalition agreement is a writ-
ten  document  containing  policy  intentions  endorsed 
by the party organizations before government inaug-
uration. Because they are often drafted under condi-
tions  that  facilitate  compromise,  party  leaders  can 
agree on more policy  deals  than they would other-
wise,  and  by  producing broad packages  the  results 
also become more acceptable to the MPs, the rank 
and file and the voters of the coalition parties. Our 
central hypothesis in this contribution is that coalition 
agreements include enforceable policy deals that help 
governments resolve conflicts and commit the parties 
to a particular course of action in decision-making.
While the literature on coalition politics was initially 
sceptical about these agreements and portrayed policy 
negotiations in government formation as acts of window 
dressing [1-3], recent empirical research convincingly 
shows  that  coalition  agreements  contribute  signific-
antly to effective coalition governance. For example, it 
has been demonstrated that coalition agreements are 
not only quite long and comprehensive (and are get-
ting  even  longer)  [4-6]  but  also  that  they  contain 
most of the substance of the government agenda [7-
9] and reduce the likelihood of inter-party conflict dur-
ing the  government's  term in  office  [8,10-12].  This 
empirical work, however, is still very limited in scope 
and often is confined to two small countries (Belgium, 
the Netherlands) in which coalitions are composed of 
parties  of  similar  size  that  have a long tradition  of 
drafting coalition agreements. Little research has ad-
dressed other configurations, such as the combination 
of  a  large  and  a  small  party,  or  situations  where 
parties have already drafted a coalition agreement be-
fore the election.
To further extend our knowledge of the role of co-
alition agreements in multiparty politics, we measure 
the extent to which coalition agreements include policy 
deals on controversial issues with precise statements. 
We then analyze a dataset of 114 cases of major in-
terparty conflict and examine the ways in which parties 
in  government  referred  to  deals  in  coalition  agree-
ments  made  over  disputed  policies,  or  experienced 
conflict  over  issues  not  addressed  in  the  coalition 
agreement. We follow the development of these con-
flicts from their initial manifestation to the successful 
or unsuccessful attempts at resolution during the life-
time of the government. Our case studies include gov-
ernments in Belgium and the Netherlands, two coun-
tries with a long practice of coalition agreements, as 
well as Italy, where coalition agreements are a recent 
phenomenon and are seen to be low-key, and Ger-
many  where  governments  are  sometimes  a  broad 
('grand') coalition but at other times consist of a large 
and a small party.
The analysis contains eleven governments in coun-
tries with institutional differences and where the sub-
stance of coalition agreements and ways of coalition 
conflict management also vary. Given the limited num-
ber of cases in this study, we must be cautious when 
making inferences about what our findings explain. 
In this  article  we consider,  for  countries  varying in 
the configuration in which coalition agreements are 
made,  whether  these  agreements  include  concrete 
policy  statements on disputed matters  and analyze 
whether political  decision making in the four coun-
tries is thus facilitated. In this way we empirically in-
vestigate the possible roles of coalition agreements 
in a more varied context than has been done in co-
alition research thus far.
2. The Role of Coalition Agreements: 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Parties joining a coalition come from campaigns dur-
ing which they emphasized their own profile and often 
indicated differences in viewpoint with other parties. 
At the negotiation table, they need to find deals and 
compromises, but these are risky because they can 
put the credibility of earlier electoral claims and prom-
ises at stake. Governing in coalition can disaffect party 
members and voters of the party. Parties coming from 
the opposition, particularly, may have developed 'rad-
ical' views and solutions that require a major leap to-
wards compromise with other parties. The words of a 
former minister and party leader illustrate this tension 
very well:
"The risk of governing is that a party in govern-
ment loses members and voters who do not recog-
nise themselves in the actions of the party. (…) It is 
a  very  subtle  game:  the  party  should  not  be 
presenting itself  at  the following elections as the 
betrayer of the party spirit. (…) It is a question of a 
balance between reality and identity." [13]
Party leaders probably face this  tension most  in-
tensely. They naturally wish to keep their leadership 
position  and  hence  try  to  minimize  party  disunity 
around their choices [1]. Although party leaders may 
be put at risk by accepting compromises and package 
deals, ignoring conflicts or not being able to decide on 
common  policies  would  certainly  go  against  their 
longer-term interests. When making each policy de-
cision,  party leaders  must  therefore appraise its  in-
trinsic  value;  its  expected  repercussion  within  the 
electorate, the parliamentary group and the rank-and-
file; and the time and effort which would be needed 
to obtain an agreement. Party leaders would (instinct-
ively) leave matters if the expected costs of a decision 
outweigh the benefits; in such cases they may prefer 
to procrastinate. 
As we see it, coalition agreements reduce the costs 
associated with policy making and enable party lead-
ers to agree on more policy deals  than they would 
otherwise. Party leaders and ministers do not have to 
negotiate  on  each  single  policy  independently  as 
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these are already mentioned in some degree of detail 
in deals in the coalition agreement. The specific condi-
tions under which coalition agreements are drafted—
behind closed doors, in a limited time, addressing mul-
tiple issues in parallel—removes public and media pres-
sure  and  facilitates  making  compromises  and  policy 
packages  [14].  Negotiators  (including  party  leaders) 
are often 'ministerable' and this further enhances the 
likelihood of agreement and commitment [15].
Consequently, we argue that party leaders engage 
in negotiations over major and often disputed issues 
and  value  the  policy  deals  included in  the  coalition 
agreement.  We expect that such deals are not just 
'everybody happy talk' but are sufficiently substantive 
and concrete to be enforceable. Parties do address is-
sues that are controversial  in government formation 
because this allows them to be linked to other matters 
that  enhance  party  and  public  acceptance  and  be-
cause they are more likely to be manageable later on. 
This early settlement also helps to make the govern-
ment less vulnerable to opposition parties trying to at-
tack the government on its weak points. 
As we know, coalition agreements are not self-en-
forcing ([16], p. 582); and ministers are not likely to 
stick to the original deals if there are no complement-
ary mechanisms constraining their actions. However, 
we would argue that ministers and MPs have many in-
centives to comply with the documents. One of these 
is  certainly  the  MP's  and  ministers'  own  ambition. 
Once in power, ministers would then prefer to avoid 
appearing being unreliable and disloyal, in order to be 
renewed in their functions and avoid continuous blam-
ing by their peers. These recent findings are related to 
the  literature  on  agreements  and  credible  commit-
ment,  which  argues  that  actors  have  incentives  to 
bind themselves to common intentions even if this re-
duces  their  leeway  in  policy  making  [8].  In  other 
words, if parties spend time and effort making deals 
over policy issues, some of which may be intensely 
disputed, they are likely to show a degree of commit-
ment  when  these  deals  are  on  the  governmental 
agenda. As written below, this may be motivated by 
political  morality  or  be a matter  of self-interest and 
reputation in the coalition game.
Our argument is not new, but the literature on co-
alition governments contains a strong view that coali-
tion agreements are either quite unsubstantive with 
just  weak  commitments  [1,17]  or  that  such agree-
ments mostly include points of interparty harmony as 
opposed to disputed matters [18]. Luebbert [1] con-
sidered the drafting of a coalition agreement to be an 
act of window dressing. His main point was that party 
leaders are motivated above all by the desire to keep 
their position and are mainly concerned with minimiz-
ing party disunity. As the concrete elaboration of prin-
ciples always generates dissension, party leaders only 
include statements in the coalition agreement that are 
so general that they do not offend anyone. Laver and 
Shepsle's [17] well known portfolio allocation model is 
based on the assumption that ministers have exclus-
ive jurisdiction over their area of expertise. Thus, they 
see coalition building negotiations as 'cheap talk' dur-
ing which nothing concrete and committing is decided 
so that coalition agreements are not enforceable. 
Recent empirical research, however, shows that co-
alition agreements do contain matters of pre-existing 
consensus. One reason for this is that the production 
of  these policy documents in  government formation 
has become institutionalized [6]. They have become a 
comprehensive type of policy agenda [6,19] and this 
expanding content includes issues of manifest conflict 
between  coalition  parties  [11,12].  Interviews  with 
(former) ministers also indicate that the reduction of 
conflict  sources and the need to  build  trust  among 
partners are the main rationales for drafting a coali-
tion  agreement.  When mistrust  is  high, agreements 
become more comprehensive and contain more points 
on which parties took divergent positions in the elec-
tion campaign [8]. Another finding is that deals in co-
alition agreements facilitate and ease decision making 
[8,11,12], and have a positive effect on the duration 
of governments [20].
Moreover party leaders can use a range of mechan-
isms to ensure that ministers (from their own party or 
a coalition partner) comply with the coalition agree-
ment. Party leaders often know who the minsters they 
appoint are and are thus in a position to screen and 
select ministers from their own party not only to en-
sure as much discipline as possible [21-23] but also to 
veto  the  nomination  of  ministers  who  have  been 
particularly disloyal to coalition deals in the past [8]. 
And these party leaders can use tools to be well in-
formed about and to control what their colleagues do. 
Examples of these mechanisms are intra- and inter-
party meetings [12,24], Junior Ministers ([16,25]; but 
see [8,26] for a different view), parliamentary com-
mittees  [18,27]  and  cabinets  and  their  preparatory 
meetings  [8]. Finally,  party  leaders  can  also  force 
another minister to act [8], for example by blocking his 
measures  in  the  cabinet  (as  in  Belgium),  by  asking 
parliamentary groups to prepare a motion of censure 
against them or to draft the legislation themselves (the 
Netherlands, Germany), or by requesting that the Prime 
Minister write the proposal himself (Italy, Germany).
This  repertoire  of  coalition  governance  includes 
tracking  and  monitoring  the  deals  in  written  policy 
agreements. In Belgian and Dutch governments, for 
example, deals on disputed issues are made and ef-
fectively enforced in most cases,  in  particular  when 
they are specified [12]. Walgrave et al. [9] compare 
the attention given to an issue in coalition agreements 
and the legislation adopted in Belgium. They demon-
strate that coalition agreements are good indicators of 
the legislative agenda. Further, Moury [8] shows that 
an  average  of  68% of  the  testable  statements  in-
cluded in the coalition agreement for eight cabinets in 
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany become 
formal cabinet decisions and sixty per cent of import-
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ant  cabinet  decisions  are  directly  traceable  to  the 
document.
In sum, the abovementioned literature argues and 
demonstrates that coalition agreements are an effect-
ive mechanism of coalition governance. Because the 
coalition  agreement  makes  it  easier  to  compromise 
and reduces agency costs, party leaders not only want 
ministers to comply with the document but can to a 
great extent oblige them to do so. In this contribution, 
we take a slightly different approach to disputed is-
sues and the way they are managed by coalition gov-
ernments.  Instead of  concentrating primarily  on the 
coalition agreement or on cabinet decisions, we focus 
on all major inter-party conflicts emerging during the 
entire  governmental  life  cycle,  from  government 
formation until  its  termination. We analyze which of 
this set of disputed issues were included in the coali-
tion agreement and which were not foreseen or were 
ignored and  emerged later.  Then  we compare  how 
these conflicts were handled during the term of the 
government. In this way we are able to see whether 
early deals included in the coalition agreement led to 
substantive government decisions more (or less) often 
than cases where no such deals existed and conflicts 
appeared during the term in office.  A focus on inter-
party  conflict  is  important  to  the  study  of  coalition 
governance  as  policy  conflicts  are  the  second  most 
frequent cause of government termination in Western 
European coalition systems after regular elections [28].
The above mentioned studies inform our contention 
that,  when facing  controversy  about  a  policy  issue, 
parties want to refer to a deal included in the coalition 
agreement when such a deal exists. Parties invest in 
settling a dispute (or at least begin addressing such 
matters) at an early stage, so as to begin the course 
of  government with a policy agenda that is  as bal-
anced and shared between the partners as possible. 
Similarly,  we  expect  that  controversies  already  ad-
dressed in a coalition agreement are more likely to be 
followed by governmental  policy  decisions  than dis-
putes between parties not previously  placed on the 
coalition  agenda.  Such  unanticipated  or  neglected 
conflicts  are  more  likely  to  destabilize  the  coalition 
and lead to inertia in governmental decision-making. 
In this way, coalition agreements involve an obligation 
to produce a result. Even when deals are not precise, 
or matters in need of political solution are placed on 
the  agenda,  coalition  members are  under  increased 
political pressure to actually find a solution when con-
flict occurs.
On the basis  of this  argument we formulate two 
hypotheses:
H1: If issues disputed during government forma-
tion are settled in deals in a coalition agreement,  
political  decisions  taken by  the government in  
office are in line with these deals.
H2: Disputes on issues during the term of a gov-
ernment  are  more  likely  to  be  followed  by  a  
political decision if the disputed issues were in-
cluded in the coalition agreement than if the dis-
putes are new to the coalition agenda.
With these two hypotheses, we thus consider the 
possibility that deals in coalition agreements do not 
permanently  remove  all  disputes  from the  coalition 
life. It is important here to appreciate that the expect-
ation from our first hypothesis is that decisions remain 
relatively  close  to  the  initial  deals  in  the  coalition 
agreement  despite  recurring  conflict.  The  deals  are 
thus expected to commit the parties even if attempts 
are made to depart from them. The second hypothes-
is is a more explicit test of whether deals in coalition 
agreements  actually  provide  returns  on  political  in-
vestments  made in  government  formation;  as  com-
pared  to  those  deals  on  which  such  early  political 
transaction costs were not made. As indicated, parties 
refraining from negotiating deals on controversial is-
sues  in  government  formation  may  have  either 
dropped the  issues  from the  agenda or  simply  not 
seen them in the first place.
3. Units of Analysis and Measurement
This  article  focuses  on  the  way  in  which  coalition 
parties make deals over controversial issues and the 
difference  deals  included  in  coalition  agreements 
make to  the  government's  political  decision-making. 
In this section, we present our units of analysis and 
approach to measurement in order to test our two hy-
potheses with empirical observations on governments 
in the four countries under study. 
3.1. Contents of Coalition Agreements
Our measure of the feasibility of coalition agreements 
relates to the doability of intentions included in such 
documents.  We build  on a technique introduced by 
Royed [29] and further developed by the Comparative 
Party Pledge Group (CPPG); we identify feasible state-
ments ('pledges') included in the coalition agreement 
and distinguish them from more general  statements 
on problems that do not specify how the coalition will 
try to overcome them. A 'pledge' is defined as 'a com-
mitment to carry out some action or produce some 
outcome, where an objective estimation can be made 
as to whether or not the action was indeed taken or 
the outcome produced' ([29], p. 79). Thus, pledges 
are testable statements as it is possible to determine 
whether they have been carried out. We distinguish 
such pledges from rhetorical statements about policy 
problems and issues which contain some intention to 
resolve the problem but leave open how this is to be 
done. While such statements may contain rhetorical 
language, they can still be relevant because fleshing 
out this intention is placed on the coalition agenda, 
and  creates  expectations  about  result  (rhetorical 
statements are something akin to the 'general policy 
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language'  of  legislation,  as  described by Huber and 
Shipan [30]).
Pledges can still be more or less precise. Relatively 
imprecise pledges leave some leeway as to how they 
are implemented, e.g. the intention to 'reduce income 
tax' or 'induce immigrants to learn the national lan-
guage'. Precise pledges contain more concrete actions 
with less room for manoeuvre, e.g. the intention to 
'reduce income tax by three per cent for all employees 
in the private and public sector in the next budgetary 
year', and to 'introduce compulsory language courses 
for all those migrating into the country, beginning on 
1 January 2008'. We counted the number of precise 
and imprecise pledges in order to measure to what 
extent  coalition  programs  are  specific  and  contain 
concrete statements.
3.2. Deals on Major Controversial Issues
After analyzing the content of coalition agreements, 
we focus on major interparty conflicts.  We consider 
disputes occurring at any time between government 
formation and termination as we analyze the degree 
to which such conflicts were anticipated in coalition 
agreements or were not foreseen or ignored. We have 
operationalized a major inter-party conflict as an in-
stance of explicit dispute that involves the mobilization 
of  party  branches—ministerial,  parliamentary,  extra-
parliamentary—or even entire parties acting en bloc in 
confrontation with one or more other parties in the 
coalition. This type of controversy differs from interde-
partmental  conflicts  where  ministers  are  involved 
primarily  as  heads  of  their  government  department 
[31]. Interdepartmental conflicts may escalate to in-
terparty conflicts, but they were only counted if this 
escalation was apparent in our data sources. This ap-
proach follows the  method used to  analyze  conflict 
management  arenas  in  the  comparative  volume on 
coalition governments by Strøm et al. [24].
We  used  national  media  sources  and  secondary 
data [32] to identify major interparty conflicts. All con-
flicts reported in annual political reports plus all con-
flicts reported in the weekly press were considered. In 
addition, a key word search was made in newspaper 
archives to select only those conflicts that were repor-
ted in the national press for more than one day (i.e. 
lasting several days or recurring at different points in 
time during the term of the government). This helped 
us to identify the major disputes on policy issues [33].
We then coded whether the conflict was mentioned 
in the coalition agreement or first appeared after the 
government took office. As noted in the previous sec-
tion, policy controversy during government formation 
may be settled through deals containing precise or im-
precise pledges, or statements that indicate a problem 
definition  and  goals  but  no  clear  course  of  action 
about solutions. Conflicts during the term of the gov-
ernment may arise over statements documented in a 
coalition  agreement or  on matters  without  previous 
reference. As noted above, unclear commitments that 
raise expectations may serve as a policy agenda be-
cause parties can take them as a starting point that 
justifies giving the issue attention, and demand that 
other parties cooperate in elaborating them to more 
concrete policies to be endorsed by the government. 
Thus we distinguish such vague commitments in coali-
tion  agreements  from  situations  where  nothing  is 
mentioned about a disputed issue [34].
3.3. Role of the Coalition Agreement in Cases of  
Controversy
We measure the degree to which parties are commit-
ted to the initial deal in the coalition agreement or to 
flesh out more general intentions on disputed issues 
by  examining  manifest  inter-party  conflicts  and  the 
actions and decisions, when taken, during the term in 
office. Commitment refers to whenever the coalition 
parties' actions and decisions were faithful to the ini-
tial deals and statements in the coalition agreement. 
Decisions refer to the production of substantive policy 
output endorsed by the executive and in parliament. 
This output can be legislation or some other type of 
policy decision, depending on what was written in the 
coalition  agreement.  We want  to  avoid  a static  ap-
proach to our analysis of commitment. A vague deal 
followed by renegotiation and a policy decision is also 
considered a case of commitment as parties elaborate 
an issue that was placed on the policy agenda. How-
ever, a procedural deal that is followed by conflict over 
what to do or negotiations in these cases lead to re-
newed stalemate are considered non-commitment to 
the coalition agreement because they violate the aim 
of  the  initial  deal,  which  is  primarily  about  conflict 
containment and less about policy substance [35]. We 
distinguish  between  decisions  and  non-decisions  as 
two possible results of conflict resolution to compare 
the outcome of controversies over issues based on the 
coalition agreement with those that are not [36].
When applying this measurement approach, we ac-
knowledge that the inclusion of a topic in the coalition 
agreement may not be a necessary condition for a type 
of conflict resolution and a substantive policy decision 
to occur. It could be that the policy deal resolving a 
conflict is simply the common denominator among the 
coalition parties that they would also have found once 
the term of the government had begun. In this sense, 
a certain type of conflict resolution may not depend on 
the inclusion in the coalition agreement. It may be that 
similar types of conflict over issues are settled in the 
same way whether or not this settlement was already 
delineated in the coalition agreement. In order to ad-
dress this issue of causal ascription of conflict manage-
ment to coalition agreements and support our argu-
ment that such agreements do have an independent 
effect, we also present four examples of highly import-
ant inter-party conflicts  and the role  of  the coalition 
agreement in producing an outcome.
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3.4. Selection of Case Studies
We  analyze  eleven  governments  in  four  countries: 
Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. These 
were selected in order to increase the variance and 
hence check the 'mobility' of our argument. In Belgi-
um and the Netherlands, parties wait for the electoral 
results  before  negotiating  the  government  coalition 
and  consequently  coalition  agreements  are  made 
after the vote. Almost all  executives taking office in 
both these countries since the 1960s had a coalition 
agreement;  this  policy  document  increased  in  size, 
peaking in 1988 in Belgium with over 40,000 words, 
and in 1998 in the Netherlands with 36,000 words. 
The length of coalition agreement has decreased in 
the  past  decade,  but  in  both  countries  agreements 
continued to be key parts of government formation in 
which party leaders and prospective ministers were in-
volved. Moreover, empirical research suggests that co-
alition  agreements  play  an  important  role  in  these 
countries [11,37].
In Germany, all coalitions have been based on post-
electoral coalition agreements since the early 1980s, so 
later than in Belgium and the Netherlands. But we also 
observe  that  the  length  of  these  documents  has  in-
creased  considerably:  from  1200  words  in  1980  to 
65,000 words in 2005. German government coalitions 
usually consist of one of the two major parties and at 
least  one  small  party,  but  so-called  Grand  Coalitions 
between the Christian Democrats and the Social Demo-
crats  were  also formed (in 1966–1969 and in  2005–
2009). We include both these types of government. Ex-
pectations regarding compliance, however, are ambigu-
ous.  On  the  one  hand,  decision-making  (and  thus 
resolution of deals) is likely to be difficult in Grand Coali-
tions, because parties must balance stronger ideological 
differences and are competing more fiercely for votes 
than a coalition composed of ideologically less diverse 
parties ([38], p. 41; [39], p. 271; [40], p. 2). On the 
other hand, in the traditional German coalition type, the 
major party controls most of the portfolios and thus it 
might be easier for them to renege on some of their 
commitments.
Italy seems the least likely case for coalition agree-
ments to have an effect on coalition governance. Italy 
has a short and recent history of coalition agreements. 
Although there were many examples of multiparty gov-
ernments,  coalition  agreements  hardly  existed  during 
the First Republic (1947–1992). This changed with the 
adoption of a new mixed electoral system in 1993, intro-
ducing a first-past-the-post system for three quarters of 
the Senators and Deputies. This induced parties to form 
a coalition prior to the elections. Since 1996, two coali-
tions  (one  center-left,  the  other  center-right)  were 
presented to the voters, including their preferred candid-
ate for the office of prime minister and a common elect-
oral  platform which would also serve as the coalition 
agreement.  While  these  agreements  were  initially 
hammered  out  mostly  by  political  outsiders,  party 
spokespeople  have  become  more  involved  in  recent 
years.  In addition,  Italy  lacks institutionalized internal 
arenas  for  managing interparty  disputes.  The lack  of 
these  internal  mechanisms  to  enforce  deals  over 
conflicts makes it harder to secure commitment as it 
implies  a  need  to  change  and  invent  institutional 
arrangements  for  negotiation  and  conflict  resolution. 
These conditions raise the political transaction costs of 
policy dispute settlement.
With these properties in mind, we selected three co-
alition governments in Belgium (Dehaene I 1992–1995, 
Dehaene II 1995–1999, and Verhofstadt I 1999–2003), 
three in the Netherlands (Lubbers III 1989–1994, Kok I 
1994–1998, and Kok II 1998–2002), two in Germany 
(Schroder II 2002–2005 and Merkel I 2005–2009) and 
three  in  Italy  during  the  Second  Republic  (Prodi  I 
1994–1996,  Berlusconi  II  2001–2006,  and  Prodi  II 
2006–2008). Whereas the Italian coalition agreements 
were  drafted  before  the  elections,  this  always 
happened after the elections in the other three coun-
tries.  Moreover,  the  Schroder  II  government  distin-
guished  itself  from  its  Dutch,  Belgian  and  German 
counterparts by its composition: a large and a small 
party that had already shown willingness to coalesce 
during the election campaign (but did not write a form-
al  coalition  agreement  at  this  stage  [41]).  All  these 
governments except Prodi  I  [42] started with parlia-
mentary majority support in the Lower House. Finally, 
with the exception of Berlusconi II in Italy [43], these 
were  successive  governments.  This  means  that  the 
cases are not independent of each other: governments 
may  have  built  on  the  experiences  of  their  prede-
cessors in managing interparty disputes.
Although the number of case studies is limited, we 
expect this approach to be replicable for other coali-
tion governments in the four countries and in a broad-
er set of countries with government coalitions—thus 
allowing  more  analytical  generalization  beyond  the 
findings we present in this contribution.
4. Empirical Results: Conflict, Agreement and 
Coalition Policy
4.1. Contents of Coalition Agreements and 
Controversial Issues
Table 1 shows the content of coalition agreements of the 
eleven governments, i.e. their length in words [44] and 
number of pledges, the number of parties and their gen-
eral ideological orientation.
In most countries, the length of coalition agreements 
varies [5] and our cases match this pattern. Although we 
observe very long coalition agreements with an average 
of more than 30,000 words, the length of these docu-
ments ranges  from just  from 7,500 to  an impressive 
92,200 words. As expected, coalition agreements con-
tain a large number of concrete pledges for which imple-
mentation can be determined (255 on average). They 
are not composed of merely vague rhetorical statements 
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as the 'sceptics' about this mechanism of coalition gov-
ernance would argue. Moreover, just over one third of 
these  pledges  are  defined  very  precisely,  containing 
policy detail.
The number of coalition parties and the ideological 
profile do not seem to affect the length of coalition 
agreements or the proportion of testable pledges in 
any systematic way. However, it should be noted that 
the two governments prolonging their term in office 
(Dehaene in Belgium in 1995 and Kok in the Nether-
lands in 1998) produced longer policy documents than 
in their first term (this has also been observed for oth-
er governments,  see [4]).  The Prodi  II  government 
also seems to testify to this phenomenon of the policy 
agenda expanding in size and detail as a government 
takes a second term.
Table 1. Properties of coalition agreements of eleven governments.






Dehaene I (1992–1995) PS, PSC, SP, CVP4, Center-Left 7,500 143 46 (32%)
Dehaene II (1995–1999) PS, PSC, SP, CVP4, Center-Left 17,350 175 40 (23%)
Verhofstadt I (1999–2003) PS, PRL-FDF-MCC, Ecolo, SP, VLD, Agalev6, Socialists, Liberals and Greens 14,800 198 110 (55%)
Average 13,200 172 65 (38%)
Lubbers III (1989–1994) CDA, PvdA2, Center-Left 28,450 157 86 (55%)
Kok I (1994–1998) PvdA, VVD, D663, Left, Conservative and Liberals 16,250 176 76 (43%)
Kok II (1998–2002) PvdA, VVD, D663, Left, Conservative and Liberals 36,000 244 152 (62%)
Average 26,900 192 107 (58%)
Prodi I (1996–1998) DS, PPI, RI, UD, Verdi5, Center-Left 41,500 274 46 (17%)
Berlusconi II (2001–2006) FI, AN, LN, CDU-UDC4, Center-Right 9,600 312 61 (18%)
Prodi II (2006–2008)
DS, Margherita, Verdi, Italia dei Valori, 
MRE, Pci, RC, UDEUR, 
Rosa nel pugno
9, Center-Left
92,200 602 55 (9%)
Average 47,800 396 52 (13%)
Schroder II (2002–2005) SDP, Greens2, Social Democrats + Left 27,200 220 80 (36%)
Merkel I (2005–2009) CDU-CSU, SDP2, Grand Coalition 52,900 297 150 (51%)
Average 40,050 259 115 (44%)
Average (Total) 31,988 255 85 (38%)
Abbreviations:  PS:  Parti  Socialiste  (French  Speaking  Socialist  Party),  PSC:  Party  Social  Chrétien  (French  Speaking 
Christian  Democratic  Party),  SP:  Socialistiche  Partij  (Flemish  Socialist  Party),  CVP:  Christelijke  Volkspartij  (Flemish 
Christian Democratic Party), PRL-FDF-MCC: Parti Républicain Libéral–Front Démocratique des Francophones–Mouvement 
des Citoyens pour le Changement (French Speaking Alliance of Liberal parties), Ecolo (French Speaking Green Party),  
VLD: Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Flemish Liberal Party), Agalev (Flemish Green Party), PvdA: Partij van de Arbeid  
(Labor  Party),  CDA:  Christen  Democratisch  Appel  (Christian  Democratic  Party),  VVD:  Volkspartij  voor  Vrijheid  en  
Democratie (Liberal/Conservative Party), D66: Democrats 1966 (Liberal Democrats), DS: Democratici di Sinistra (Italian  
Leftist Party),  PPI: Parti  Populare Italiano (Italian Popular Party), RI: Rinnovamento Italiano (Italian Renewal), UD: 
Unione Democratica (Demoratic Union), FI: Forza Italia, AN: Alleanza Nazionale (National  Alliance), LN: Lega Norte 
(Northern League), CDU-UDC: Cristiani Democratici Uniti—Unione Christiana Democratica (Italian Christian Democrats), 
Margherita (center-left party), Verdi (Greens), Italia dei valori (Italy of values), MRE: Movimento Repubblicani Europei 
(European  Republicans),  PCI:  Partito  dei  Communisti  Italiani  (Communists),  RC:  Rifondazione  Communista 
(Communists), UDEUR: Unione Democratici per l'Europa (left Catholic party), Rosa Nel Pugno (Secular party), SDP:  
Sozialdemokratische  Partei  Deutschlands  (Social  Democrats),  CDU:  Christlich  Demokratische  Union  Deutschlands 
(Christian Democrats), CSU: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria).
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This  contradicts  the  intuition  that  parties  in  such 
governments are more familiar, display a lower level 
of mistrust and thus feel less need to stipulate policies 
in advance. Finally, and perhaps less surprisingly, the 
Grand Coalition in Germany engaged in placing a larger 
number  of  precise  deals  in  the  coalition  agreement 
than a traditional coalition of a big and a small party.
Overall,  the coalition agreements we analyzed in-
clude a large number of specific and precise policies. 
Italian  pre-electoral coalition  agreements  were  not 
shorter  or  less  specific  than  post-electoral agree-
ments.  In  fact,  the  opposite  seems  true;  the  pre-
electoral Prodi II agreement of 2006 stands out for its 
length: longer than any other agreement in any of the 
other three countries with a tradition of drafting such 
agreements. An explanation for this may be that pre-
electoral agreements also serve as electoral platforms 
for presenting a range of policy preferences and in-
tentions to the voters. They are therefore expected to 
include the preferences of the pre-electoral coalition 
on each issue of interest to the public. Not all these 
issues were disputed between the parties, nor were 
they included in precise pledges.
We also observe a large difference between coali-
tion agreements in Italy and the other countries: an 
average  of  around  40  per  cent  precise  pledges  or 
more in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands com-
pared with just 13 per cent in Italy. Just 9 per cent of 
the pledges in the long Prodi II agreement were very 
precise.  It  may  be  that  uncertainty  about  electoral 
results and the risk of displeasing voters discouraged 
parties and negotiators to go into great detail.
4.2. Early Attention to Controversial Issues in All  
Countries
As noted, usually only a part of the coalition agree-
ment is devoted to controversial issues. Many state-
ments and policy pledges involve no real controversy 
between the partners. We collected data on the most 
controversial  policy problems within the eleven gov-
ernments throughout their life cycles, i.e. from forma-
tion to termination and registered and coded a total of 
115  major  inter-party  conflicts.  Table  2  shows  the 
number of conflicts in each government and the policy 
areas in which these conflicts occurred. It shows that, 
in  relative  terms,  Belgian  governments  experienced 
less  manifest  conflict  than  the  other  governments. 
This may in part be explained by the strong emphasis 
on  collective  responsibility  and  collegial  decision-
making; ministers  are prevented from criticizing de-
cisions  once  adopted  within  the  Cabinet.  Another 
reason may be that parliament does not really stand 
as a strong and politically critical institution vis-à-vis 
the government. Parliamentary party groups rarely ini-
tiate conflict and still less when this may evoke coali-
tion tensions. Table 2 also shows that socio-economic 
and budgetary policy issues have been the most con-
troversial. This stood out most in the Kok I and II co-
alitions  which  excluded  the  central  Christian  Demo-
crats and where a considerable policy distance had to 
be bridged on these issues. It is visible to a lesser ex-
tent in the Verhofstadt I government in Belgium ([45], 
see [46]). In Italy, the proportion of budgetary and 
socio-economic conflicts is lower; one reason for this 
may  be  coalition  composition.  Although  there  are 
marked differences between the parties of the same 
coalition,  especially  in  the  center-left  coalition,  this 
was  not  the  main  point  of  disagreement  between 
them. Institutional change and regulatory issues with-
in the field of justice also gave rise to conflict in all 
our cases except Prodi I and Schroder II. The severe 
crisis over the national justice system was a key prob-
lem in the 1990s in Belgium; in the Netherlands, the 
call for democratic reforms by D66, the smallest coali-
tion party in Kok I and II, triggered major conflict in the 
late 1990s; in Italy the State and Justice reform was a 
source  of  disagreement  and  conflicts  on  health  and 
pension reform appeared to be pre-eminent in Germany.
Morality issues surfaced in the Kok I government in 
the Netherlands (rules  on divorce),  and during Ber-
lusconi (genetic modification) and Prodi (civil unions). 
Other  issues  on  which  the  religious-secular  divide 
played a part were related to school policy (Kok I gov-
ernment). Our cases therefore show that policy con-
troversies  over  religious-secular  issues  never  disap-
peared from the agenda in coalition politics, though 
they are not as salient as in earlier times in Belgium 
and the Netherlands.
We next assess whether the emerging conflicts were 
already addressed in the coalition agreement. Failure to 
mention issues may have been deliberate or because 
they were not anticipated. Table 3 presents the number 
of conflicts for each of the eleven governments, distin-
guishing between those already mentioned and those 
not mentioned in the coalition agreement. We also spe-
cify whether the coalition agreement was precise on 
the controversial issues that were included.
Table 3 shows that 74 per cent of all conflicts was on 
matters already mentioned in the coalition agreement. 
Agreements  therefore  mention  deals  and  stipulate 
courses of action over disputed issues, as we expected. 
Coalition agreements in Italy were not found to men-
tion these conflicts significantly less often than in Ger-
many,  Belgium and the  Netherlands.  More than two 
thirds of the conflicts (22 out of 32 cases, 69 per cent) 
in the three Italian governments were over an issue 
mentioned in the coalition agreement. Matters of con-
troversy had been referred to in Dutch and German 
agreements more often (in 88 and 78 per cent of the 
cases, respectively), but less so in Belgium (in 56 per 
cent of the cases). We note however that the govern-
ment which did not anticipate conflict was the one of 
Dehaene II (1995–1999). This was in office during a 
period of extraordinary institutional stress after the po-
lice and the judicial system had repeatedly failed to ar-
rest and imprison a murderous paedophile (the Dutroux 
scandal). Although Christian Democrats and Socialists 
124
were in office together for a second term, the disputes 
in this government were mostly unforeseen given the 
unusual circumstances.
With  the  exception  of  the  Dutch  governments, 
where financial plans are quite specific, a minority of 
conflicts relate to precise policy deals. It is, however, 
difficult to determine cause and effect here as precisely 
defined policy deals might be those that are more con-
sensual; or alternatively consensus might be driven by 
the ex-ante precise definition of the policy. 
4.3. Role of Coalition Agreements in Cases of  
Controversy
Our first hypothesis on conflicts and agreements in the 
four countries is that coalition parties are committed to 
deals on issues included in coalition agreements. Com-
mitment concerns loyalty to policy deals and forms of 
conflict  resolution  mentioned  in  the  coalition  agree-
ment,  and  it  includes  the  ability  to  produce  formal 
policy decisions in line with the agreement. We stress 
again that our focus is on deals resolving an interparty 
conflict and we do not analyze other issues leading 
peacefully to decisions that may or not be based on 
the coalition agreement (see [7,8] for such a broader 
analysis).  In order to see whether this happened, we 
traced  the  political  follow-up  process  of  these  initial 
deals throughout the term of the government. Table 4 
presents  our  findings  on the  degree  of  commitment 
and the production of policy decisions.


















Dehaene I 3 1 - - - 1 - - 5
Dehaene II 3 2 2 - - - - - 7
Verhofstadt I 2 1 1 - 2 - - - 6
Lubbers IIII 3 - 1 1 - 1 - - 6
Kok I 6 2 - - 1 - 1 1 11
Kok II 5 2 1 1 - - - - 9
Prodi I 3 1 4 1 - - 1 1 11
Berlusconi II 3 3 3 1 - - 1 3 14
Prodi II 2 - - 1 - 2 1 1 7
Schroder II 2 - - 13 - 2 - 2 19
Merkel I 2 2 4 5 1 4 - 2 18
Total 113
Table 3. Conflicts on issues mentioned and not mentioned in coalition agreement (N = 76).




Precise in coalition 
agreement
Dehaene I 5 1 4 1
Dehaene II 7 6 1 0
Verhofstadt I 6 1 5 1
Sub-total 18 8 (44%) 10 (56%) 2 (11%)
Lubbers III 6 3 3 2
Kok I 11 0 11 6
Kok II 9 0 9 7
Sub-total 26 3 (12%) 23 (88%) 15 (58%)
Prodi I 11 5 6 2
Berlusconi II 14 4 10 4
Prodi II 7 1 6 1
Sub-total 32 10 (31%) 22 (69%) 7 (22%)
Schroder II 17 2 15 1
Merkel I 21 7 14 2
Sub-total 38 9 (24%) 29 (76%) 3 (8%)
Total 114 (100%) 30 (26%) 84 (74%) 27 (24%)
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Table 4. Types of result in conflict management (N = 76).
Conflict over issue included 
in agreement
Conflict over issue not 
included in agreement Total
Decision Non-decision Decision Non-decision Decision Non-decision
Dehaene I 4 0 1 0 5 0
Dehaene II 1 0 4 2 5 2
Verhofstadt I 5 0 0 1 5 1
Subtotal 10 (100%) 0 (0%) 5 (62%) 3 (38%) 15 (83%) 3 (17%)
Lubbers III 3 0 3 0 6 0
Kok I 10 1 0 0 10 1
Kok II 9 0 0 0 9 0
Subtotal 22 (96%) 1 (4%) 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 25 (96%) 1 (4%)
Prodi I 4 2 3 2 7 4
Berlusconi II 9 1 4 0 13 1
Prodi II 3 3 1 0 4 3
Subtotal 16 (73%) 6 (27%) 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 24 (75%) 8 (25%)
Schroder II 15 0 2 0 17 0
Merkel I 14 0 7 0 21 0
Subtotal 29 (100%) 0 (0%) 9 (100%) 0 (0%) 38 (100%) 0 (0%)
Total 77 (92%) 7 (8%) 25 (83%) 5 (17%) 102 (89%) 12 (11%)
4.4. Commitments Are Weaker for Minority 
Governments
On average, parties committed to a previous deal in 
73 out of the 84 cases (87 per cent) in which we iden-
tified final government endorsement and political im-
plementation  of  a  deal  mentioned  in  the  coalition 
agreement. This evidence supports our hypothesis.
Our  findings  however  also  reveal  differences 
between the countries: while most of the deals were 
implemented in all four countries, governments in Italy 
displayed a lower degree of commitment than those in 
Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. More specific-
ally:  Belgian  and  German  policymakers  stuck  to  all 
deals made, those in the Netherlands had been able to 
make the most precisely defined deals, and also carried 
them  out  almost  without  exception.  By  contrast,  in 
Italy, the Prodi I and II governments showed commit-
ment to only half the deals made during government 
formation. The Berlusconi II government outperformed 
them in  this  respect  and its  enforcement  score was 
only slightly below that of  governments in  Germany, 
the  Netherlands  and  Belgium.  This  government  also 
had the highest number of conflicts, so its performance 
is remarkable.
Thus,  although commitments  are  weaker  in  Italy 
than in other countries, the enforcement problem was 
particularly  acute  in  the  two  Prodi  governments.  A 
closer look at these governments shows that the ma-
jor cause of non-commitment was the lack of a parlia-
mentary vote on legislation that had already obtained 
government endorsement. Data on the legislative pro-
cess in Italy show that parliament passed only half the 
bills during the two Prodi governments compared with 
nearly 90 per cent of the bills during the Berlusconi II 
government [47-50]. This is explained largely by the 
minority  status  of  Prodi  I  and  the  vulnerable  small 
majority of Prodi II [51]. Another reason for this may 
be that—contrary to the Netherlands and Germany—
MPs in Italy are not involved in drafting the coalition 
agreement. While this seems less problematic in the 
case of Belgium, where the Parliament is extremely 
disciplined,  commitments  made  between  parties  of 
the Center-Left Italian coalitions were structurally dif-
ficult  to  enforce.  Although  we  must  be  cautious  in 
making inferences, it seems that small coalition size 
was more important as an unfavorable condition for 
commitment than the pre-electoral status of the coali-
tion  agreement.  These conditions  may be  politically 
connected in these two governments, but our findings 
on the other Italian government suggest that commit-
ment to a pre-electoral agreement is actually possible.
4.5. Less Frequent Decisions Taken by Italian Center-
Left Governments
In our second hypothesis, we expect inter-party con-
flicts related to a deal in the coalition agreement to be 
followed by a decision more often. Table 5 shows the 
type of (non-) decisions following an inter-party con-
flict.  In  most  instances  (89  per  cent),  decisions  fol-
lowed interparty conflict  resolution in the four coun-
tries.  While  major  interparty  conflicts  may  have 
delayed the policy process, the governments in charge 
of  these  issues  managed to  overcome the  disputes 
and took policy decisions in most cases. A second ob-
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servation is that decisions were taken predominantly 
when issues were mentioned in the coalition agree-
ment (92 per cent). When controversy was new and 
issues  were  not  foreseen,  the  result  of  the  conflict 
was a decision in 83 per cent of the cases. Our find-
ings therefore provide some support for our second 
hypothesis,  even  though  a  decision  is  sought  and 
found  in  most  cases.  Though  political  transaction 
costs prior to the term of the government thus seem 
to have paid off,  our findings suggest that coalition 
commitments  and mechanisms of  conflict  resolution 
extended beyond what  was  written  in  the  coalition 
agreement. Our observations suggest that the inform-
al  rule of  coalition discipline applies more generally, 
which  is  in  line  with  recent  work  on  coalition  gov-
ernance ([6], pp. 176–179).
Comparison of the governments in the four coun-
tries shows that the political success rate (for adopt-
ing  a  government  decision  following  conflict)  was 
lower in Italy (75 per cent), again mainly in the two 
Center-Left  Prodi  governments,  than  in  the  Nether-
lands (96 per cent),  Belgium (83 per cent) or  Ger-
many (100 per cent). In Belgium, the coalition agree-
ment seems to have made the greatest difference to 
producing results (100 per cent against 62 per cent), 
while in Germany none of the conflicts led to decision 
failure.  In  the  Netherlands,  the  small  difference 
between  matters  stipulated  in  the  agreement  and 
those  left  unmentioned  suggests  that  conflict  man-
agement mechanisms and coalition discipline are in-
ternalized among parties in government; this is also 
true for issues that were unaddressed or were not an-
ticipated during government formation.
Table 5. Commitment to deals in the coalition 
agreement (N = 55). This ratio is calculated for 
cases in which the issue was mentioned in the 



















While we must be cautious in making causal infer-
ences about coalition agreements and policy output, 
our findings indicate that  commitment  to  deals  and 
substantive decisions in situations of major interparty 
dispute was more problematic in the Italian coalitions, 
in particular in the two Center-Left governments that 
lacked stable majority support. The Italian cases thus 
show that multiparty governments may develop simil-
ar  mechanisms  of  coalition  governance  to  those  in 
countries where this is institutionalized (this comple-
ments the recent analysis of Zucchini on the role of 
governments in legislative agenda setting, see [52]). 
However,  the bottom line for making such mechan-
isms effective is one of the key rules of democratic 
government: deals on public policy need a parliament-
ary majority for political endorsement. If such majorit-
ies need to be established from one issue to the next 
during the term in office, even deals made in coalition 
agreements  prior  to  the elections are  just  tentative 
ways of conflict settlement and commitment.
5. Coalition Agreements and Conflict 
Resolution: Four Examples
In order to examine more closely how correspondence 
of  findings  may  also  point  to  causality,  we present 
four examples of conflicts within coalitions that are il-
lustrative of the role of the coalition agreement.  As 
stated above, comparing results of conflict for cases 
included with those not included in a coalition agree-
ment  allows us to  see  how the coalition  agreement 
actually  make  a  difference  to  streamlining  decision 
making. The examples show that negotiators are loyal 
to the coalition agreement, even if they have second 
thoughts  or  disagree  with  what  is  written,  and  that 
parties invest in finding a solution if a conflict arises 
over a  policy  intention  included in  the document.  If 
they refrain from such political updating to re-establish 
consensus, it may lead to the fall of the government.
We first  look  at  the  measures  taken by  the  De-
haene I government to reduce the public deficit. This 
objective was mentioned in the coalition agreement, 
without  a  precise  definition  of  how  the  reduction 
should take  place.  In the  course of  the  legislature, 
poor economic growth made it difficult to meet this 
objective and the Minister of the Interior, Vande Lan-
otte (a Flemish speaking Socialist), presented a plan 
to  reduce  the  deficit  in  the  long  term.  While  the 
French  speaking  ministers  (Socialists  and  Christian 
Democrats) supported the idea, the Flemish Christian 
Democrat  ministers  were  under  pressure  from their 
party organization and fiercely  advocated a shorter-
term reduction of the deficit. The conflict between the 
French Speaking Socialists and the Flemish Democrats 
reached its peak when the former proposed to intro-
duce a crisis tax and the latter the non-indexation of 
incomes. As no agreement could be reached, Prime 
Minister  Dehaene  presented  his  resignation  to  the 
King in March 2003 but it was not accepted. A meet-
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ing  was  then  organised  between  Dehaene  and  the 
party leaders and a compromise was found (largely by 
selling public assets).
Another relevant example can be found during the 
Kok II government when the coalition agreement con-
tained  the  intention  to  complete  a  Constitutional 
revision necessary for a corrective referendum. This 
Constitutional  revision  passed  through  the  Chamber 
with  the  required  two  thirds  majority  but  it  was 
vetoed in the Senate due to dissent from a prominent 
MP from the VVD, one of the coalition parties. This led 
to the resignation firstly of the Liberal Democrat (D66) 
Minister  Els  Borst-Eilers,  and  then  of  the  whole 
government. D66 Party leader De Graaf then stated 
that the bill was based on the coalition agreement and 
therefore had to be considered a 'governmental affair' 
that needed immediate settlement. A few weeks later, 
a  compromise  was  found among party  leaders  and 
ministers, and the legislative process to introduce a 
'temporary' referendum was restarted and completed. 
The bill  on the referendum now contained a sunset 
clause, but this appeared sufficient for D66 to carry 
on in the coalition.
The decision taken by the Grand Coalition to in-
crease the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years 
was also both important and controversial. The meas-
ure was extremely unpopular, had not figured in any 
of the election manifestos of either of the two parties, 
and was not an issue in the election campaign [53]. 
However,  the  partners  agreed on  it  in  the  coalition 
agreement. As a compromise to the SPD, the coalition 
agreement also stated that  at  the beginning of  the 
next decade the legislature would reassess whether 
the increase in the retirement age was still justified, 
taking into account labor market conditions and the 
economic and social situation of the elderly. As noted 
by a former SPD minister, the measure was very con-
troversial within his party: "It was a part of the coali-
tion agreement and both party conventions approved. 
But in the Social Democrat party a lot of people were 
thinking  'we  will  never  do  that,  we  negotiated  it, 
signed it,  voted for  it,  but we will  never do it'.  Mr 
Munterferring  [the  Social-Democratic  Minister  for 
Labor and Social Affairs and party chairman] said that 
it was in the coalition agreement, and that we had to 
approve it. Doing that, he took a lot of heat from the 
party".  As our interviewee notes,  Franz Muntefering 
indeed took this responsibility and presented his plans 
increase the retirement age in January 2006. Despite 
facing protests from both trade unions and important 
party members, the cabinet agreed on a bill that fol-
lowed the coalition agreement. This bill subsequently 
was passed in both Chambers.
Finally,  we  consider  the  issue  of  regionalization 
('devolution')  included in the coalition agreement of 
the  Berlusconi  II  government.  The  relevant  bill 
triggered  conflict  within  majority  parties  inside  the 
government, but particularly in parliament. The depu-
ties of Allianza Nazionale amended essential points of 
the  text,  which  were  included  in  the  coalition 
manifesto, and the ministers of Lega Nord threatened 
to resign as a consequence. Berlusconi then declared 
that 'devolution is in the programme (…). They (i.e. 
MPs  from  Allianza  Nazionale)  have  not  understood 
what risks they were facing.  These risks are huge'. 
Finally, party leaders (who were also ministers) met 
and  agreed  not  to  change  the  substance  of  the 
regionalization program. The text was finally passed in 
both chambers in October 2004.
6. Conclusion
Our empirical findings strongly suggest that coalition 
agreements are enforceable and commit parties, fur-
ther discrediting the idea that there agreements are 
merely pep talk that does not really commit parties in 
office. Coalition agreements in Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and also in Italy include substantive and 
concrete  policy  statements,  one  third  of  which  ap-
pears to be precise. These agreements also include is-
sues  that  were  controversial  during  government 
formation or were considered in need of special atten-
tion to avoid inter-party dispute at a later date. Three 
quarters  of  all  major  inter-party  conflicts  occurring 
during  the  term  in  office  of  coalition  governments 
were on matters already addressed previously in the 
agreement. In these instances, the initial deals were 
important as reference points to help contain the con-
flict,  avoid  further  escalation,  and  facilitate  the  en-
dorsement  of  political  decisions.  Substantive  results 
were less frequent in situations when interparty policy 
controversy was over new issues on the agenda and 
was not addressed during government formation, but 
the  difference  was  not  as  large  as  expected.  Also, 
when policy conflict was not identified and settled be-
forehand, decisions were produced in the vast major-
ity of cases (83 per cent against 92 per cent when co-
alition deals existed).
This finding also holds true for Italy as a country 
where written coalition agreements with substantive 
content are presented before elections and are a re-
cent phenomenon. Although coalition agreements in 
Italy are as long as those in the three Northern coun-
tries,  agreements  in  the  latter  countries  stipulate 
policy  intentions  in  greater  detail.  The inverse rela-
tionship  between  length  and  precision  in  Italy—
extensive  packages  containing  rather  general  and 
sometimes even ambiguous deals—may be linked with 
the  pre-electoral  status  of  the  coalition  agreement. 
Parties may have fewer incentives to commence costly 
political  transactions  before  knowing  the  election 
results. Unexpectedly, however, a more complete and 
precise coalition agreement emerged when a coalition 
was preparing for a second term (Dehaene I and II, 
Kok I and II) or after a short intermezzo of a different 
coalition in office (Prodi II). Newly formed coalitions 
did not produce longer agreements. Prolonging a term 
in office or restarting after a short intermezzo is thus 
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not only a demonstration of mutual trust. Remaining 
or  suspended  conflict,  unfinished  policy  trajectories 
and  alleged  shortcomings  of  a  previous  incomplete 
coalition agreement are also incentives for parties to 
negotiate  policy  before  taking  office.  First  empirical 
work on the attention given to major policy topics in 
coalition agreements in the Netherlands suggests that 
prolonging  governments  considerably  changes  their 
focus  of  attention  [19].  Similarly,  but  perhaps  less 
surprisingly,  the  Grand  Coalition  specified  a  larger 
number of policy deals that were also more precise 
than before.
Secondly,  our  findings  provide  evidence  for  the 
view that  when controversy occurs,  coalition  agree-
ments  do  commit  parties.  We  found  that  conflicts 
were more often settled if there was already a deal in 
the coalition agreement to refer back to, and in these 
cases decisions were also mostly in line with what was 
initially agreed. Additionally, we presented an example 
for  each  country  that  that  showed  how  coalition 
parties are under the obligation to solve a conflict that 
arises over an item included in the coalition agree-
ment. Failure to do this may threaten the survival of 
the government.
However, this evidence is not equally strong for the 
four countries. The greatest difference in substantive 
results between issues included and not included in 
the  coalition  agreement  was  found  in  Belgium. 
Though  unforeseen  conflicts  ending  in  stalemate 
rather than decisions were over matters of exceptional 
institutional stress in the Dehaene II government, the 
reference in this country to the agreement as the 'co-
alition bible' seems well placed [54]. In the Nether-
lands and Germany, the difference between pre-iden-
tified and unforeseen policy conflicts between parties 
was small or even nonexistent, but we also note that 
there were few cases of conflict over issues not yet 
addressed in the coalition agreement. A clearer differ-
ence was  found between the  three governments in 
Italy.  While  the  Berlusconi  II  government  produced 
decisions mostly in line with the coalition agreement, 
the two Center-Left Prodi governments suffered from 
decision-making inertia. Our case analyses show this 
was due mostly to the lack of stable support from a 
parliamentary majority.
These overall results indicate the conditions under 
which deals in coalition agreements are made and en-
forced. Contrary to a long held view in coalition re-
search, coalition agreements do contain controversial 
issues and deals made on them. While these deals do 
not iron out coalition trouble and in fact often become 
the  subject  of  further  tensions  between  coalition 
partners, they do commit them. Opportunistic behavior 
or claims about 'changing circumstances' appear to be 
contained in coalition arenas for conflict management, 
and decisions mostly follow the path initially set in the 
coalition agreement. Accordingly, coalition agreements 
not only function as early policy agendas of coalition 
governments, but also indicate a course of action in 
political decision making.
This  contribution  gives some preliminary  answers 
and points the way for further empirical  analysis of 
conflict management and agenda setting in coalition 
governments  with  agreements.  These  agreements 
may be made before or after parliamentary elections, 
and they may be exposed to conditions of majority or 
minority support in parliament. When this research is 
extended to more cases, with variation in independent 
variables, it  may further enhance our understanding 
of the way in which coalition governance is organized 
and what  are its  results  from initial  agenda setting 
during coalition formation and throughout the lifetime 
of  governments.  As  in  the  Italian  cases,  parties 
forming  pre-electoral  coalitions  may  avoid  detailed 
predefinition  of  policies  given the uncertainty  about 
electoral results and the risk of displeasing voters with 
compromises  made  between  parties  with  different 
identities. But on the other hand, such pre-electoral 
agreements involve a more direct mandate than post-
electoral  agreements,  and for  this  reason they may 
imply a stronger sense of commitment. Further ana-
lysis should then also give more extensive considera-
tion to the effects of varying sizes of parliamentary 
support,  from  supermajorities  to  minority  govern-
ments. A more specific focus on this would include the 
analysis  of  support  agreements  between  coalition 
parties  and  opposition  parties  on  single  issues  or 
packages of issues. Although it is more than 25 years 
since Strøm [55] argued that opposition parties can 
be well placed to influence policy, systematic empirical 
results to test this proposition are only beginning to 
appear [56]. The possibilities for further study may be 
based on the same idea that inspired our present con-
tribution, namely that analysts should address issues 
throughout the coalition lifecycle  in  order to  under-
stand what coalition governments do. The still grow-
ing  frequency  of  coalition  governments  in  Europe 
provides a wealth of empirical data for such work.
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